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MATERNAL LIABILITY: COURTS STRIVE TO
KEEP DOORS OPEN TO FETAL PROTECTIONBUT CAN THEY SUCCEED?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, science has made rapid advances in the area of
prenatal medicine.' The ability to detect fetal abnormalities during
the early stages of pregnancy allows corrective measures to commence while the fetus is in the womb, thus enhancing the
probability of successful treatment.' Additionally, fetal surgery is
being performed with increasing success.3 Scientists are also estab1. Prenatal is defined as "existing or occurring before birth, with reference to
the fetus." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1252 (25th ed. 1974) [hereinafter MEDICAL DICTIONARY]. A result of the increased knowledge with regard to fetal
development, function, and environment, is that the medical community now regards
the fetus as a patient entitled to the same care as a pregnant woman. N. GRANT, P.
MACDONALD & J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 139 (17th ed. 1985) [hereinafter
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS].

For purposes of this article, the unborn will be referred to as a

fetus, regardless of the actual gestational age. The unborn actually passes through
three stages of development: the ovum stage, from conception through the first two
weeks; the embryonic stage, from two weeks through eight weeks; and the fetal stage,
from eight weeks until birth. M. F. ASHLEY MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES, 21-31
(1962).
2. An experimental test has been developed which identifies fetuses that may
be susceptible to retinoblastoma, an eye cancer. Benowitz, A Prenatal Test for Cancer, 127 Sci NEWS 12 (1985). Retinoblastoma runs in families, therefore, a fetus is
likely to develop the disease if a parent and another child in the family have the
disease. Id. The advantage of this prenatal test is that tumors can be detected earlier,
resulting in milder cancer treatments. Id.
3. In one case, a 21 week old fetus was partially removed from its mother's
uterus, operated on, and returned to the uterus. Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient:
Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 AM. J. LAW. & MED. 1, 16-17 (1983). The surgery,
however, was performed too late to correct all of the abnormalities, and the infant
only survived its birth for nine hours. Id. at 17 n.103. The increase in fetal surgery is
largely the result of ultrasound, which provides the surgeon with' a picture of the
fetus in the womb. Clark & Witherspoon, Surgery in the Womb, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 31,
1983, at 78. Fetal surgery is currently performed for only a limited number of defects.
These include hydrocephaly and blocked urinary tracks. Holcomb, When the Patient
is Still in the Womb, SAVVY, Nov. 1984, at 90. Hydrocephaly is a condition where
there is a fluid accumulation in the cranium, leading to an enlarged head and a prominent forehead. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 729. Hydrocephaly results in
brain atrophy and mental deterioration. Id. A blocked urinary tract leads to abnormal lung development, kidney damage and death, shortly after birth. Witherspoon,
supra, at 78. Current research is underway to perform fetal surgery to correct spina
bifida and encephaloceles, both neurological defects. Kolata, Fetal Surgery For Neural Defects?, 221 Sci. 441 (1983). Fetal surgery is performed with moderate success. In
the case of hydrocephaly, the survival rate is approximately 80%. Witherspoon,
supra, at 78. The survival rate in the blocked urinary tract operations is approximately 50%. Holcomb, supra, at 90.
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lishing causal relationships between the mother's intake of various
substances and subsequent defects in the fetus." Numerous other
environmental factors are also linked with abnormal fetal growth
and development.5 As a result of medical studies, courts are faced
with the issue of whether a mother owes a duty of care to her unborn child and, if so, what are the remedial consequences of a
breach of this duty.
The essence of prenatal rights, in the context of a maternal
duty of care, is the right to be born with a sound mind and body.6
While every child clearly deserves to be born with a sound mind and
body, the imposition of a maternal duty of care is not compatible
with the present state of the law concerning a woman's rights, which
stems from the Roe v. Wade7 decision. This comment will examine
the common law fetal rights as well as the recent expansion of these
fetal rights in the area of tort law. The comment will then analyze
the maternal duty in light of the tort law expansion of fetal rights.
Next, the comment will examine the state interest in the unborn
and state intervention in maternal care versus maternal interests.
Finally, the comment will look at the recent cases holding that the
maternal duty of care exists under the child abuse and neglect statutes, thus creating criminal liability for breach of duty. The comment concludes that a maternal duty of care should not be imposed
through civil or criminal measures, or through state intervention, except in life-saving situations.

II.

HISTORY OF PRENATAL RIGHTS

The law has always been schizophrenic in the area of prenatal
4. Infants born to cocaine users may suffer prenatal strokes, respiratory and
kidney problems, "visual problems, lack of coordination and developmental retardation." Wallis, Cocaine Babies, TIME, Jan. 20, 1986, at 50. The infants of cocaine abusers may also be more susceptable to sudden infant death syndrome. Id. Heavy drinking can lead to "minor facial abnormalities and mental retardation." The Littlest
Victims, LAWIs HOME J., Sept. 1985, at 180 [hereinafter The Littlest Victims]. Maternal smoking may lead to lung disease in the subsequently born child. Id.
5. Studies are linking environmental pollution to fetal abnormalities. The Littlest Victims, supra note 4, at 179. Drinking water tainted with chemicals was linked
to increased infant death, as well as increased ear and eye defects. Id. at 181. A community near a former uranium mine was found to have a rate of birth defects that
was five times greater than the national average. Id. at 183. Some doctors even recommend that pregnant women avoid household products, including "oven cleaners,
paints, insecticides, hair spray, hair coloring and relaxers, and furniture polishes."
Ways To Protect Your Unborn Child, EBONY, July, 1986 at 72 [hereinafter Ways To
Protect Your Unborn Child].
6. Courts have recognized this right. "[A] child has the legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body." Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503
(1960).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This is the landmark abortion decision, holding that a
woman's right to privacy gives her the absolute right to terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester. Id. at 163.
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rights. The common law always granted the fetus certain property
rights.' A fetus could take by will;9 it could inherit property;"0 it
could have a guardian appointed to protect it's property;" it could
be the beneficiary of a trust; 2 and, it could prevent the application
of the Rule Against Perpetuities."5 All of these property rights, however, were conditioned upon the subsequent live birth of the fetus.'
No property rights existed where a fetus was stillborn." Therefore,
these property rights did not establish that the fetus was a person
per se. The common law, thus, was concerned with the realization of
the testator's intent, rather than the protection of the fetus."
In contrast to property law, criminal law has historically not extended any rights to the fetus.' At common law, feticide was not
considered murder.' 8 Killing a child in the womb after it had
achieved viability constituted a misdemeanor. 9 If, however, one's
8. "An infant.., in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many
purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold estate made to
it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to
it's use, and to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually born." 2
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 130 (1769).
9. See Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834) (bequest to "children
living at my death" includes unborn fetus).
10. See Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 (1882) (unborn child could taken devise
of land as tenant in common with its mother).
11. See Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907) (consent of unborn
child's guardian necessary prior to division or sale of devised property).
12. See Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200 A. 467 (1938) (posthumous child entitled to share in trust left to "surviving children").
13. See Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 560 (1869) (unborn child may take either
vested or contingent remainders).
14. See Doudera, Fetal Rights? It Depends, 18 TRIAL 38, 39 (1982). (unless born
alive, fetus has no estate rights or property rights).
15. Id. at 39 (fetus has no property rights, regardless of fetal age, if stillborn).
16. Damme & Shaw, Legal Status of the Fetus, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 4
(1976) (courts primarily concerned with testator's intent). For a discussion of property law in relation to the fetus, see Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal

and Logical Inconsistencies, 46

NOTRE DAME LAW

349 (1971).

17. See State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876) (child does not have independent
life until it breathes on its own). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973)
("There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live
birth.").
18. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. McKee, 1 Add. 1 (1791) (in order to charge
mother with homicide, state had to prove child had been born alive and then killed).
19. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth
it in her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and
she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the antient
law homicide or manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look upon this
offence in quite so atrocious a light, but merely as heinous misdemeanor.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 129-30.
"Quick" was the common law term for viable, defined as "pregnant and able to
feel the fetal movements." MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1299. "Quickening"
is defined as "the first recognizable movements of the fetus, appearing usually from
the sixteenth to the eighteenth week of pregnancy." Id.
A viable fetus is one "that has reached such a stage of development that it can
live outside the uterus." Id. at 1714. Various factors affect viability, such as fetal age
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actions caused a viable child to be born alive and it subsequently
died, only then was the act considered murder.2 Therefore, at common law, personhood did not attach until the fetus was born alive.2
This common law tradition has generally continued into the modern
area of criminal law." States continually refuse to recognize the killing of a fetus, in the womb, as murder.2 2
Similar to the criminal law's treatment, the common law did not
regard an injury to the fetus as an actionable tort either.2 4 The
landmark decision in this area was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northhampton, 5 where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied recovery in a wrongful death action brought on behalf
of an infant.2 6 In Dietrich, an infant was born prematurely and died
approximately fifteen minutes later due to the defendant's negligence. " Several reasons advanced for the denial of recovery included
the lack of precedent, 8 exclusion of a fetus from the wrongful death
statute,29 the difficulty in establishing a causal relationship, 0 and
the danger of fraudulent claims.2 The court denied recovery, however, mainly because it found that the unborn child was not a sepaand weight. Benowitz, supra note 2, at 11. The exact time of viability, then, is difficult to identify. Generally, viability is thought to occur between 24 and 28 weeks. Id.
See also Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1975) (viability includes ability to live outside womb with aritificial aid and is a matter of medical judgment); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (viability usually occurs between 24 and 28 weeks).

20. See R.

PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW

140 (2d ed. 1969) (common law predicated

murder or manslaughter conviction on live birth).
21. For a discussion of ancient attitudes toward the unborn, see generally Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-41; Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and
the Status of the Fetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14
N.Y.L.F. 411, 411-28 (1968).
22. See, e.g., People v. Greer, 79 Ill.2d 103, 116, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (1980)
(feticide not murder unless fetus, following live birth, dies as a result of the injuries
received). But see People v. Apodaca, 76 Cal.App.3d 479, 486, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830, 835
(1978) (assaulting pregnant woman, absent consent, with the intent of murdering her
fetus can constitute murder).
23. See Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can The State Intervene?,
23 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1984). (Model Penal Code definition of homicide as "causing the death of a person who has been born and is alive" predominates).
24. "But no case, so far as as we know, has ever decided that, if the infant
survived, it could maintain an action for injuries received by it while in its mother's
womb." Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15 (1884).
25. Id. at 14.
26. The court declined to analogize this situation to the English common law
situation, where injury to a woman pregnant with a viable fetus resulting in a premature birth and subsequent death of the infant, was considered murder. Id. at 15.
27. The infant's mother, while she was four or five months pregnant, slipped
and fell on the highway. Id. at 14.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id. at 16.
31. Id. at 17.

19871

Maternal Liability

rate entity from its mother.3 2
The Dietrich rule, as it became known, was followed by all jurisdictions for the next sixty-two years. 3 In 1946, however, the District Court for the District of Columbia, in Bonbrest v.Kotz, 34 allowed recovery for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries to a viable
fetus, which was later born alive. 5 The Bonbrest decision reflected
the evolution of medical science since 1884, when Dietrich had been
decided. 6 Particularly, the court recognized that because an unborn
viable child is able to live without the aid of its mother,3 7 it is a
separate entity from its mother.3 s Today, all jurisdictions allow a
cause of action for the negligent injury of a viable fetus, which is
later born alive.39
Since the Bonbrest court's recognition of prenatal torts, courts
have continued to expand upon the concept of a third party's liability to a fetus. Several jurisdictions have eliminated the viability requirement, 40 viewing it as an arbitrary requirement, because the
32. "[Tihe unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury....
Id.
33. But see Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 372, 56 N.E. 638, 642
(1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (would allow cause of action on behalf of a viable fetus,
for prenatal injuries, conditioned on its live birth). See also Nugent v. Brooklyn
Heights R. Co., 154 A.D. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (1913) (court seemed willing to recognize prenatal rights, but held that a carrier's duty in this case extended only to
mother).
34. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
35. The complaint charged professional malpractice in taking the child from its
mother's womb. Id. at 139.
36. "[Mledical science certainly has made progress since 1884." Id. at 143.
37. "Here... we have a viable child ... which has demonstrated its capacity to
survive by surviving.... Id. at 140 (emphasis in original).
38. "[WIhile dependent for its [the viable fetus] continued development on sustenance derived from its peculiar relationship to its mother, it is not 'part' of the
mother in the sense of a constituent element .... Id.
39. See, e.g., Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d
909 (1951) (viable fetus has cause of action for injuries); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill.
2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973) (allowing wrongful death action for stillborn
fetus, with viability as limitation on suits); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d
412 (1953) (cause of action allowed for prenatal injuries resulting in death of subsequently born infant), rev'd Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 111.359, 56 N.E. 638
(1900); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951) (child may sue for
injuries inflicted when he was viable fetus); Keyes v. Construction Serv., 340 Mass.
663, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) (tort action may be brought on behalf of child injured as
viable fetus); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (wrongful
death action allowed for death of viable fetus prior to birth); Rainey v. Horn, 221
Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954) (after point of viability, wrongful death action may be
brought on behalf of unborn); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87
N.E.2d 334 (1949) (court allows recovery for injury inflicted on viable fetus); Puhl v.
Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) (court points
out present state of the law concerning prenatal injury). See generally W. KEETON &
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 368 (5th ed. 1984) (in every jurisdiction, child born
alive has cause of action for prenatal injuries and for wrongful death if child dies
after birth due to injuries).
40. See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co. 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727
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subsequently born child suffers the same injury regardless of

whether he was viable at the time the injury was inflicted."1 These
jurisdictions, which recognize the fetus as a separate entity from its
mother, have replaced the viability standard for recovery with a
standard that is premised on the child's right to begin life with a
42
sound mind and body.
This standard has been implemented to hold third parties liable
for negligent acts which are committed prior to conception and result in injury to the later born child. 43 In these preconception tort
cases, the time between infliction of the injury and conception has
ranged anywhere from several months" to eight years.' 5 These gaps
4
in time are justified under the basic tort concept of foreseeability. '
For example, in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,47 a child was in-

jured as the result of a negligent blood transfusion given to her
mother when her mother was thirteen-years old.' The Illinois Su(1956) (if causal relationship is established, child can recover for injury inflicted at
any time in prenatal period); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691
(1961) (infant born alive can recover for injuries sustained prior to viability); Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971) (court recognizes action for
prenatal injuries, regardless of time when injury was inflicted); Bennett v. Hymers,
101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958) (previable fetus may recover for tortious injury);
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (allows recovery, whether fetus
was viable or not at the time injury occurred); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 125
N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953) (can recover for injury inflicted at any point of fetal life); Sinkler
v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (cause of action allowed for injury inflicted
on one month old fetus). But see Green v. Smith, 71 Ill. 2d 501, 377 N.E.2d 37 (1978)
(no cause of action for injuries and death of pre-viable fetus).
41. See Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960) (opportunity to obtain remedy should be given regardless of fetal age at the time of injury,
because resulting harm is same following birth).
42. Id. at 364, 157 A.2d at 503. (justice demands recognition of right to sound
mind and body).
43. For a discussion of preconception torts, see Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB. L. REV. 706 (1977); Comment, Preconception Torts: A Look At Our Newest Class of Litigants, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 97
(1978); Note, Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived, 48 U. COLo. L. REV.
621 (1977); Comment, Recognizing a Cause of Action for Preconception Torts in
Light of Medical and Legal Advancements Regarding the Unborn, 53 UMKC L. REV.
78 (1984).
44. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1973) (birth control pills taken several months prior to conception altered mother's
chromosome structure, resulting in mongoloid twins).
45. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 I1. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (negligent blood transfusion given to mother eight years prior to conception damaged fetus). See also Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (negligent Caesarean section injured child born two years later).
46. "Foreseeability" is an element of proximate cause and is defined as "[t]he
ability to see or know in advance; hence the reasonable anticipation that harm or
injury is a likely result of acts or omissions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 584 (5th ed.
1979) [hereinafter BLACK'S].
47. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
48. The blood transfusion sensitized the mother's blood because she was given
Rh-positive blood, which was incompatible with her own Rh-negative blood. Renslow
v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 349, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (1977). The mother's
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preme Court held that because it was foreseeable that a thirteen
year old girl would one day marry and become pregnant,4 9 the hospital responsible for the transfusion was liable for the injury to the
child conceived after the negligent act."
The Renslow decision demonstrates the vast changes in prenatal tort law since Dietrich. In light of these changing fetal rights, the
next logical extension is to allow a child to recover from its mother
for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries." Historically, this recovery would have been barred because of the parental immunity doctrine.2 The modern trend, however, has been to abrogate this doctrine. 3 As a result of the trend, courts, for the first time, are faced
with the issue of whether a mother can be liable to her unborn child.
III.

MATERNAL LIABILITY IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION

In order to assess maternal liability for negligence, it is necessary to examine the concept of parental tort immunity. Parental immunity is not a common law concept;"4 the doctrine was first established. in 1891.55 Justifications for the doctrine include: preservation

of family harmony;56 preservation of parental discipline and con-

trol;"7 preservation of the fabric of society; 8 fear of fraud; 9 fear that
the suit would deplete the resources for the other children;60 and the
fear that, if the child died, the parent would inherit the judgment
sensitized blood resulted in the induced premature delivery of the child and in permanent brain and nervous system damage. Id.
49. Id. at 365, 367 N.E.2d at 1258 (Dooley, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
51. Cf. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900)
(court denies action against third party for prenatal tort, foreseeing expansion of prenatal tort liability to mother for negligence).
52. "[P]arent is immune from liability for negligence in an action brought by
his or her child ..
" Black's, supra note 46, at 1004.
53. "[T]he trend has been to abolish or restrict such immunity." Id.
54. See Prosser, supra note 39, at 904 (no reason to think English law denied
personal tort action between parent and child).
55. "The doctrine of parent-child immunity seems to have developed in
1891.
... Comment, Recovery for PrenatalInjuries: The Right of a Child Against
Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 582, 591 (1976).
56. See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (society has interest in preserving domestic harmony which forms basis for parent-child tort
immunity).
57. See, e.g., Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (no parentchild cause of action when relationship is such that parent has duty to control child
and child has duty to obey).
58. Id.
59. E.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 252, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (1960) (increased risk of collusion when suit brought by one family member against another
family member and when family will receive financial gain).
60. See, e.g., Roller, 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789 ("it would not be the policy
of the law to allow the estate, which is to be looked to for the support of all the minor
children, be appropriated by any particular one.") (emphasis added).
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that the child had recovered."' These justifications, however, have
become less compelling in recent years, as today, exceptions to the
doctrine are relied on more often than the doctrine itself."2
In many jurisdictions, the exceptions to the doctrine of parental
immunity have led courts toward its abrogation. 63 Absent the availability of parental immunity, the four elements necessary in any negligence action would have to be established before maternal liability
would arise. 4 The first element of negligence requires a legal duty or
obligation on the part of an actor to conform to a reasonable standard of conduct, in order to protect others from unreasonable risk of
harm.6" Second, there must be a breach of that duty.6 6 Third, the
actor's conduct must be a proximate cause of the injury. 7 Finally,
the injured party must sustain actual damage or loss.68 The first two
elements of a negligence action, duty and breach6 9of duty, will be
difficult to define in a maternal liability situation.
Most would agree that there is a moral duty, on the part of a
mother toward her unborn child, to refrain from engaging in activities which pose an unreasonable risk of harm to the fetus. Recognition of a legal duty, however, involves defining a maternal standard
of conduct and defining unreasonable risk to the fetus. In determining a standard of conduct in negligence actions, courts generally balance the risk, in terms of the social value of the threatened interest
and the probability and extent of the harm, against the actor's interest and the reasonability of the actor's conduct. 70 The actor's inter-

est, or the maternal interest, in this situation, is the mother's right
61.

See id. ("if a child should recover a judgment from a parent, in the event of

its death the parent would become heir to the very property which had been wrested
by the law from him.").
62. See generally Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 5, 199 N.W.2d 169, 171 n.2
(1972) (list of states abandoning parent-child tort immunity); PROSSER, supra note
39, at 904-07 (discussing parent-child tort immunity).
63. See, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963) (one of the
first courts to expressly abrogate parental immunity).
64. Negligence "refers only to that legal delinquency which results whenever a
man fails to exhibit the care which he ought to exhibit .... It is characterized chiefly
by inadvertance, thoughtlessness, inattention, and the like .... [the] [d]octrine of negligence rests on duty of every person to exercise due care in his conduct toward others
from which injury may result." BLACK'S, supra note 46, at 930-31.
65. PROSSER, supra note 39, at 164. Duty is defined as an "obligation to which
law will give recognition and effect." BLACK'S, supra note 46, at 453. Reasonable is
defined as "suitable under the circumstances." Id. at 1138.

66.

PROSSER,

supra note 39, at 164.

67. Id. at 165. Proximate cause exists when "the inury or damage was either a
direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission." BLACK'S
supra note 46, at 1103.
68. PROSSER, supra note 39, at 165.
69. For a discussion of maternal duty to her unborn child, see generally Comment, Parental Liability For Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 47
(1978); Doudera, supra note 14.

70.

PROSSER,

supra note 39, at 173.
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to personal privacy 1 and the right of control over her own body.7 2
This is the interest that the United States Supreme Court recognized in Roe v. Wade. 73 This maternal right, however, is not absolute and is subject to certain limitations.7' In a tort context, which is
different from the Roe v. Wade situation, the maternal right is balanced, not against a state interest in potential life,75 but against the
fetal interest in the right to be born with a sound mind and body.76
As discussed previously, this fetal right has already been established
77
in third-party tort cases.
Once the competing rights are established, the reasonability of
the maternal conduct must be balanced against the probability and
extent of harm to the fetus.7 8 Defining the reasonability of the maternal conduct requires an analogy to third-party negligent conduct.7 As in the third-party tort cases, courts will determine reasonability according to either a post-viability standard" or a
foreseeability standard, 1 depending on that particular jurisdiction's
precedent. Both standards, however, pose inherent problems when
applied to maternal conduct.
First, in those jurisdictions allowing recovery only for injury to
a viable fetus subsequently born alive, many injuries will go uncompensated. This is premised on the fact that the most critical stage in
embryonic development, 2 the stage when the fetus is most suscepti71. "[A] right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
72. The fourteenth amendment protects liberty interests of individuals and protects individuals from unnecessary bodily restraint. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 324 (1981).
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. "[T]he right of personal privacy.., is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests. . . ." Id. at 154.
75. See id. at 159 (state interest in potential life is involved in abortion decision
at some point).
76. One author has called this right the "right to be well born," embracing
rights to adequate physical, mental and emotional prenatal care. Ament, The Right
to Be Well Born, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 25, 27 (1974).
77. See supra note 6.
78. This is a delicate balancing process, given the variety of factors and substances which may affect fetal growth and development. For an exhaustive discussion
of fetal rights, see generally Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J.
LEGAL MED.

63 (1984).

79. The third-party tort differs from a maternal tort because in the third party
situation, the defendant commits a tort upon the fetus through the body of the
mother; while in the maternal tort case, the mother is more or less directly inflicting
the injury. See PRosSER, supra note 39, at 367 (discussing prenatal injuries).
80. See supra note 39 and text accompanying notes 35-39 for a discussion of the
forseeability standard.
81. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the postviability standard.
82. The embryonic stage begins approximately three weeks after conception.
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 139. During this stage, the basic organs of the
embryo develop. PRENATAL INFLUENCES, supra note 1, at 29. This is called the period
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ble to environmental factors,"3 is the first trimester.84 In the first
trimester, the major organs and basic tissues develop in the unborn
child.8 5 Because the first trimester is a pre-viability period,86 however, a mother may be immune from liability for negligent acts she
commits at a time when the likelihood of damage is the greatest.
Another problem with the viability standard is the difficulty in
determining when viability occurs.8 7 The time of viability differs
with each fetus.88 Furthermore, the exact moment when a certain
environmental factor affected the development of the fetus is difficult to pinpoint.8 9 A cause and effect relationship between maternal
care and fetal injury has been scientifically established, but the precise time of the effect remains speculative." As a result, the proximate cause in a negligence action against a mother would be difficult
to prove.0 '
Just as the viability-requirement jurisdictions are not conducive
of organogensis. Id. By the end of the embryonic period, the fetus is clearly distinguished as human. Id. at 30.
83. These environmental factors are called teratogens; agents or factors causing
"the production of physical defects in the developing embryo." MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 1, at 1549. "Susceptibility to teratogenic agents, in general, decreases as
organ formation advances and using becomes negligible after organogensis is substan-

tially completed."

WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS,

supra note 1, at 799.

84. A trimester is three calendar months long; gestation is often referred to as
consisting of three trimesters. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 139.
85. After the first trimester, fetal development consists of the growth and maturation of already formed structures. Id. at 140. "Few, if any, new major structures are
formed" after approximately two months. Id.
86. Although viability is generally thought to occur between 24 and 28 weeks,
viablility continues to move to younger stages. Halcomb, supra note 3, at 93.
87. Several factors determine viability, including fetal age, fetal weight and organ development. Lenow, supra note 3, at 11 & n.71.
88. In addition, as advances are made in the care of premature infants, viability
may occur at earlier stages. A premature baby weighs 2,500 gm. or less at birth. PRENATAL INFLUENCES, supra note 1, at 398. A fetus that weighs less than 400 gin. at birth
has no chance of survival and one that weighs from 400 to 999 gin. has a low chance
of survival. Id. at 398-99.
89. A teratogenic agent may have different effects depending on the stage of
embryonic development. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 799. Furthermore,
the fetus may have been exposed to more than one teratogenic agent. Different teratogens have different effects, even when introduced at the same time. Id. Therefore,
a precise cause and effect relationship is virtually impossible to establish.
90. Another problem in establishing cause and effect is that a genetic disposition may produce a teratogenic response to a factor not normally teratogenic. Id. at
802.
91. Proximate cause requires a direct relationship or reasonably probable relationship between the actor's conduct or omission and the resulting injury. PROSSER,
supra note 39, at 165. This element of a negligence action would be difficult to prove,
for example, in cases where factors are thought to cause defects and abnormalities,
but the results remain inconclusive. Caffeine at the level of approximately two cups of
coffee per day is suspected of hindering skeletal development. Ways To Protect Your
Unborn Child, supra note 5, at 72. Other studies, however, suggest that defects are
caused only if the pregnant woman consumes the equivalent of 26 cups of coffee per
day. Starr, The Twelve Month Pregnancy, 6 AM. HEALTH 56, 62 (1987).
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to maternal liability, the jurisdictions with foreseeability requirements are also faced with difficulties. For example, if a third party
may be liable for negligent acts causing injury to a fetus prior to
conception, 2 should a mother also be held liable for engaging in
similar pre-conception negligence? Applying a foreseeability analysis, it is foreseeable in the case of most women that one day they
will become pregnant. 93 Arguably, then, women could be held to a
standard of care throughout their child-bearing years.94 Even though
the absurdity of this kind of standard is apparent, it is consistent
with a foreseeability analysis.
Pre-viability recovery presents problems similar to the pre-conception recovery problems. Most women are not aware that they are
pregnant until weeks after conception occurs.9 Consequently, the
woman may continue to use potentially harmful substances" or to
92. The number of jurisdictions permitting pre-conception negligence actions
against third parties remains small. PROSSER, supra note 39, at 369. One fear with the
expansion of the pre-conception tort claims is that cases will arise involving second
and third generations genetically damaged due to radiation or toxic chemical exposure. Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability For Injury To The
Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DuKE
L.J. 1401, 1438.
93. Cf. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 365, 367 N.E.2d 1250,
1258 (1977) (defendant hospital and doctor charged with knowledge that 13 year old
patient would one day marry and become pregnant). Many doctors now recommend
that women prepare for pregnancy, in order to prevent birth defects. Ways To Protect Your Unborn Child, supra note 5, at 68.
94. See Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability
for PrenatalInjuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 368 (1984)
("a woman [could be] ... subject to a standard of conduct for her entire lifetime
prior to the conception of her child which could result in legal liability."). Cf. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 245 ("systematic health care beginning long before
pregnancy undoubtedly proves quite beneficial to the physical and emotional wellbeing of the mother-to-be and, in turn, her child-to-be.").
95. There may be a reasonable likelihood of pregnancy "as early as a few days
after a missed menstrual period." WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 247. In most
women, conception has occurred two or three weeks prior to the time when a reasonable likelihood exists. Id. The average duration of pregnancy is generally 282 days. Id.
at 246. The majority of women, however, are unaware of their pregnancy until the
eighth week or longer. Ways To Protect Your Unborn Child, supra note 5, at 68.
96. Many substances are known or thought to be harmful to a developing fetus.
Smoking during pregnancy leads to lower birth weight infants and a higher number
of unsuccessful pregnancies. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 258. See generally Comstock & Meyer, Maternal Cigarette Smoking and Prenatal Mortality, 96
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1 (1972) (inverse relationship between number of cigarettes
smoked by mother and infant's birth weight); Seligman, Women Smokers: The Risk
Factor, 106 NEWSWEEK 76, 77 (1985) (effects of smoking on infant results in focusing
antismoking campaign on pregnant women). But cf. Montgomery, PrenatalSmoking,
OMNI, Sept. 1983, at 49. (infants born to smokers half as likely to develop Respiratory
Distress Syndrome than infants born to non-smokers). Excessive alcohol intake will
likely produce fetal abnormalities, and chronic alcoholism can lead to fetal alcohol
syndrome, which is fetal maldevelopment. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 72.
Children born to even moderate drinkers may suffer a withdrawal similar to the withdrawal experienced by heroin babies. Drinking For Two: New Warning For MothersTo-Be, Jan. 1985, at 37 MCCALLS [hereinafter Drinking For Two]. Alcohol intake may
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participate in activites that are harmful to her unborn child, 97 unaware of her pregnancy. Under a foreseeability standard, however,
because it is foreseeable that she could become pregnant, she would
have violated her standard of care."8
One argument opposing the imposition of this standard of care
is that the woman should not be held to a standard where she is
unaware of her pregnancy. The counter-argument to limiting a
mother's liability is that third parties are held liable for their negligence, even though they are unaware that a woman is pregnant."
Waiving liability until a woman is aware of her pregnancy would be
contrary to the underlying policy of the jurisdictions which base recovery on the foreseeability of the injury.10
Another problem associated with a foreseeability analysis is the
unplanned pregnancy situation. 10 ' Should a woman trying to conceive a child be held to a higher standard of care than one who is
not? Because no method of birth control is fail-proof, it remains
foreseeable that a pregnancy might occur even if a woman was attempting to prevent pregnancy. Therefore, even in the unplanned
be most harmful during the first weeks of pregnancy. Starr, supra note 91, at 62.
Drugs such as heroin, barbiturates and amphetamines not only harm the fetus, but
also lead to withdrawal at birth. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 259. See
generally Desmond, Verniaud & Wilson, Early Development of Infants of HeroinAddicted Mothers, 126 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 457 (1973) [hereinafter Heroin Mothers]
(children born to heroin addicts exhibit low attention span, hyperactivity and maladaptive behavior); Desmond, Schwanecke, Wilson, Yasunaga & Burgdorgg, Maternal
Barbiturate Utilization and Neonatal Withdrawal Symptomatology, 80 J. PEDIATRICS 190 (1972) (barbiturate withdrawal in infants similar to heroin withdrawal);
Goodfriend, Klein & Shey, The Effects of Maternal Narcotic Addiction on the Newborn, 71 AM. J. OBST. & GYNEC. 29 (1956) [hereinafter Maternal Narcotic Addiction]
(withdrawal symptoms at birth include restlessness, irritability, constant shrill crying,
vomiting, diarrhea and convulsions); Perlmutter, Drug Addiction in Pregnant
Women, 99 AM. J. OBST. & GYNEC. 569 (1967) (high rate of prematurity and congenital
anomalies in infants born to drug addicts); Schenkel & Vorherr, Non-Prescription
Drugs During Pregnancy: Potential Teratogenic and Toxic Effects Upon Embryo
and Fetus, 12 J. REPRODUCTIVE MED. 27 (1974) "With rare exception, any drug that
exerts a systemic effect in the mother will cross the placenta to reach the embryo and
fetus." WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 260.
97. If a pregnant woman is injured, the fetus may be indirectly injured due to
inadequate oxygen intake. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 797.
98. An interesting sidelight of the foreseeability analysis is the possible duty of
parents to refrain from reproduction if it is more than likely that the fetus will be
defective. Shaw, supra note 78, at 81. This situation would be analogous to cases
where a physician has been held liable for negligent genetic counseling, resulting in
wrongful birth or wrongful life lawsuits. Id. at 82.
99. In fact, the mother would know she is pregnant even if the pregnancy was
not showing. Pregnancy generally is not apparent to a third party until the fourth or
fifth month. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 249.
100. The policy of these jurisdictions is to compensate the injured fetus for violation of its right to be born free from injuries. Robertson, supra note 92, at 1438.
101. See Beal, supra note 94, at 367 (argument could be made that woman not
using contraception during intercourse "knew or should have known that she could
conceive").
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pregnancy situation, a woman might be held to a standard of care.
In addition to predicating maternal liability on a third party
liability standard, liability may be based on the abrogation of parent-child immunity. 10 2 This approach was used in Grodin v.
Grodin,03 where a child sued his mother for taking Tetracycline
through her eighth month of pregnancy.0 4 The Tetracycline caused
his teeth to be brown and discolored. 105 The Michigan Supreme
Court in Grodin held that parental immunity did not bar the suit,
unless the mother had acted with reasonable parental discretion in
taking the drug.'
07
This reasonable parent standard is difficult to formulate.
Parenting is a very personal experience. Notions of reasonability
may vary depending on one's nationality, race, or socio-economic
class, among other things.'0 Furthermore, courts are reluctant to interfere in the parent-child relationship.'0 9 It is unlikely, then, that a
reasonable parental discretion standard would provide much guidance for courts in determining liability."0 It is unlikely that courts
would even be able to define a reasonable parent."'

Although most courts have not faced the issue of maternal tort
102. In a very recent case, the Illinois Appellate Court for the first time allowed
a child to sue its mother for injuries sustained in a car accident, when the mother was
pregnant. Stallman v. Youngquist, 504 N.E.2d 920, 925 (1987). The court noted that
family harmony and fear of collusion are no longer sufficient justifications for denial
of intrafamily suits. Id. In fact, the court stated that family harmony would be preserved, because financial hardship would be eased if the suit was successful. Id. at
926. The court limited the abrogation of parental tort immunity to tort cases arising
out of automobile accidents. Id.
103. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
104. Id. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 869.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 401, 301 N.W.2d at 871. In overruling parental immunity, the Michigan Supreme Court retained two exceptions: (1) where the alleged negligence involves
an "exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child"; and (2) where the alleged negligence "involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect
to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services and other
care." Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (1972).
107. See Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to
Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795, 810 (1976) [hereinafter The
"Reasonable Parent" Standard] (main objection to reasonable parent standard is
that courts cannot realistically determine reasonableness).
108. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 602 (1980) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting) ("parent is the best, and perhaps only, witness capable of expressing the
personal, cultural and socio-economic principles by which he raises his children.").
109. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943) (there is a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter").
110. For a discussion of the abrogation of parental immunity and the evolution
of the "reasonable parent" standard, see Beal, supra note 94; The "ReasonableParent" Standard, supra note 107.
111. Cf. Haddrill v. Damon, 149 Mich. App. 702, 386 N.W.2d 643 (1986) (failing
to instruct child in use of dirtbike within scope of reasonable parental authority).
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liability, the Grodin"2 case reflects that the potential for these lawsuits does exist. Theoretically, the notion of civil liability for maternal negligence is sound. The practical application of tort liability,
however, could impose unreasonable restrictions on a woman's right
to control her own body throughout her child-bearing years.' 13
Finally, maternal tort liability is not the best solution to the
problem of negligent prenatal care. The basic precept of tort law is
to compensate one for his injuries." 4 The ultimate goal, however, in
recognizing that prenatal rights exist is to prevent injury to the developing fetus." 5 Compensating a prenatally injured child may provide some deterrence for maternal negligence, but would not sufficiently advance the fetus' right to be born with a sound mind and
body.
IV.

STATE INTERVENTION IN PRENATAL CARE

One way to prevent fetal injury or death is for the state to intervene on behalf of the unborn and enjoin the mother from continuing harmful practices or compel the mother to submit to treatment
that will help the fetus." 6 This approach is more likely to prevent
fetal injury or death than the tort liability approach."' In a state
intervention approach, the mother's constitutional rights" 8 would be
balanced against the state's parens patriae interest in the welfare of
the fetus"' and the fetus's right to be born with a sound mind and
112. One author sees the Grodin case as illustrative of the trend toward frivolous suits against parents, alleging minor defects or abnormalities. Shaw, supra note
78, at 98.
113. A more rational, middle of the road approach is that a woman plan for her
pregnancy at least three months in advance. The newest trend is toward pre-pregnancy clinics, providing care and counseling to prospective mothers. Starr, supra note
91, at 56.
114. "A plaintiff's remedy in tort is compensatory in nature and damages are
generally intended not to punish a negligent defendant but to restore an injured person as nearly as possible to the position he or she would have been in had the wrong
not been done." Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 232, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (1982).
115. "The right recognized in all prenatal cases has been the right to be born
free of mental and physical defects." Beal, supra note 94, at 363.
116. For suggestions concerning the limits of state intervention, see Ament,
supra note 76; Comment, The Right of the Fetus to Be Born Free of Drug Addiction,
7 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 45 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Limitations of State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1981) [hereinafter Constitutional
Limitations].
117. See ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 116, at 1052 n.5 ("intervention
...would be more likely to prevent harm and would cause far less tension in the
parent-child relationship.").
118. One commentator has suggested that a woman who chooses to continue a
pregnancy has sacrificed her freedoms and liberty to act however she wants. Robertson, Procreative Liberty And The Control Of Conception, Pregnancy, And Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437-38 (1983).
119. Parens patriae is the state's power to "act as guardian to persons with
legal disabilities such as infants, idiots and lunatics." BLACK'S, supra note 46, at 1003.
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body. 120
In most of the cases that have raised the issue of state intervention in prenatal care, courts are willing to recognize the right of the
child to be born with a sound mind and body as superior to maternal rights.'2 1 These cases, however, have been limited to situations
where state intervention is necessary to save the fetus' life' 22 and
where the fetus is viable. 23 The state intervention, then, does not
conflict with the Roe v. Wade. 24 decision. Roe held that the state
interest in potential life, after the fetus has achieved viability, is sufficiently compelling to supersede any maternal interests. 2 '
Additionally, the viable fetus' right to live has been held so significant as to compel a woman to submit to a Caesarean section
against her will. 12 6 In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital
Authority,' a Caesarean section was deemed necessary to save a
fetus' life, 12 but the unborn child's mother refused the surgery on
religious grounds. 9 The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the
state's duty to protect the fetus and to prevent its death outweighed
the intrusion upon the mother's freedom of religion. 2 0
In Jefferson, the state intervention was justified because it was
a life-saving procedure and because the fetus clearly was viable.'2 '
Given the increase in successful in utero s2 fetal surgery, however,
questions remain concerning how much state intervention will be al120. The fetus has the right to enjoin its mother from conduct which would
harm it. Robertson, supra note 118, at 438. The mother must strive to produce as
healthy a child as possible. Id.
121. But cf. Taft v. Taft, 338 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983) (state interest in
seeing fetus carried to term not sufficiently compelling to justify restriction on
mother's constitutional rights, when she refused surgery necessary to "hold" her
pregnancy).
122. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 274
S.E.2d 457 (1981) (with surgery, fetus had almost 100% chance of surviving).
123. See, e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42
N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964) (fetus approximately eight months old).
124. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
125. Id. at 163.
126. A caesarean section is an "incision through the abdominal and uterine

walls for delivery of a fetus."

MEDICAL DICTIONARY,

supra note 1, at 1394.

127. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
128. Another factor was that the mother's chances of survival without the Caesarean were only 50%. Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
129. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 87, 274 S.E.2d 457,
458 (1981).
130. "The Court finds that the intrusion involved into the life [of the mother] .
is outweighed by the duty of the State to protect a living, unborn human being
from meeting his or her death before being given the opportunity to live." Id. at 89,
274 S.E.2d at 460.
131. The mother was 39 weeks pregnant. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County
Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).

132.
794.

In utero means "within the uterus."

MEDICAL DICTIONARY,

supra note 1, at

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 20:747

lowed. May the state intervene and compel a woman to submit to
surgery when the fetus is not yet viable? According to Roe v.
Wade, s the state interest in potential life would not be sufficiently
compelling at this point to justify intervention. 1 34 In recognizing fetal rights, however, the Roe decision may not be controlling.' The
fetal right to be born with a sound mind and body remains unchanged throughout gestation.3 " The combination of the fetal right
and the state interest may be sufficient to outweigh the maternal
interests during the pre-viability stage.
Another unanswered question is whether the state can intervene
where fetal surgery will benefit the unborn, but is not necessarily
life-saving.1 7 The fetal interest in this situation remains unchanged
from the last situation. 38 The state interest is in the quality of potential life, rather than the potential life itself.'3 " It is unlikely that
courts will construe the state interest in the welfare of the fetus as
sufficiently compelling to outweigh maternal constitutional rights.'40
The result is that the state's parens patriae interest may justify intervention in life-saving situations, but may not be sufficient to protect the fetal interest in being well born.'
The issue of state intervention arises in the context of enjoining
maternal behavior, as well as in compelling a woman to submit to
treatment.' May the state, then, exercising its parens patriae pow133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. "[Tlhe 'compelling' point is at viability." Id. at 163.
135. The United States Supreme Court did not address the issue of fetal rights
at all in Roe.
136. Gestation lasts approximately 40 weeks. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note
1, at 246.
137. It has been suggested that the view requiring a mother to submit to all
fetal surgery, unless the surgery threatened the maternal life, should be rejected because it indicates approval of a "fundamental right to be born healthy.'" Comment,
The Fetal Patient And The Unwilling Mother: A Standard For Judicial Intervention, 14 PAC. L.J. 1065, 1086 (1983) [hereinafter The Fetal Patient].
138. The fetal surgery situation is analogous to cases where parents refuse medical care for their children. The Fetal Patient, supra note 137, at 1069-70. The fetus
however, has not been recognized as a person, therefore its rights may not be compelling in a non-necessary surgery situation.
139. Cf. Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 335, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983) (in weighing state interest versus maternal rights, court is influenced by fact that record does
not show "whether the operation is merely desirable or is believed to be necessary as
a life-saving procedure").
140. Cf. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 843 (3rd Cir. 1981) (individual's liberty
interests allow him to refuse medication).
141. This is complicated by the fact that, although promising, fetal surgery cannot guarantee that a child will be born with a sound mind and body. In the case of
surgery to correct hydrocephalus, over half of the fetuses operated on still encountered developmental problems. Holcomb, supra note 3, at 91. The survivors of urinary tract fetal surgery also may encounter further disabilities. Id. at 90.
142. One example of the trend toward enjoining harmful maternal behavior is a
New York City ordinance which requires any place that sells alcohol to post a warning to pregnant women that alcohol may cause birth defects. Silas, An Issue Is Born,
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ers, force a woman to discontinue harmful practices? 4 s The policy

behind the doctrine of parens patriae is that parents do not always
act consistently with the child's welfare. " Extending this parens
patriae interest to the fetus means that the state may limit maternal discretion during pregnancy if the state finds that the mother is

not acting consistently with the fetus' welfare interests. 4 "

An example of maternal behavior that a state would want to
limit would be maternal drug abuse.' .4 One area in particular involves the situation of pregnant heroin addicts.' 4 The suggestion is
to statutorily provide for compulsory detoxification of heroin addicts
who are in their third trimester when the state interest in potential
life is sufficiently compelling."18 Analogous situations would involve
alcoholic mothers, as well as those addicted to cocaine." 9e
The problem with allowing the state to enjoin maternal behav71 A.B.A.J. 21 (1985).
143. Cf. Matter of Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980) (state
parens patrie interest in newborn suffering drug withdrawal sufficient to remove
child from mother's custody).
144. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 I11.618, 104 N.E.2d 769
(1952) (parental refusal to allow child to receive blood transfusion constitutes neglect); Custody of a Minor, 373 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (court may limit
parental autonomy if it appears that the child's health or welfare may be jeopardized
by the parental decision).
145. Some experts would justify intervention on the grounds that the mother is
committing prenatal abuse. "Prenatal abuse is unjustified mistreatment of the embryo/fetus; it is a form of child abuse which begins before birth," Overall, "Pluck A
Fetus From Its Womb": A Critique Of Current Attitudes Toward The Embryo/Fetus, 24 U.W. ONTARO L. REv. 1,2 (1986).
146. One area of maternal drug use which is on the rise is the use of cocaine.
Cocaine addicted babies "now constitute 60% of drug-affected babies born to addicts
... at Northwestern Memorial Hospital in Chicago. In Los Angeles they account for
more than half of the drug-associated births." Wallis, supra note 4, at 50.
147. A mother "who takes heroin is actively causing harm to herself and to
[her] infant." Perlmutter, supra note 96, at 47. The [sitate must protect the rights of
the fetus "who has no choice but to take the drug and suffer the agonies of withdrawal at birth, possibly coming into the world prematurely with a less-than-average
chance of survival." Id. One court facing the issue held that a viable fetus was included in the term "child" in the child abuse statutes and that a mother's use of
heroin in the last two weeks before delivery, resulting in the newborn's heroin addiction, constituted child abuse. In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc.2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (1986).
Contra Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal.Rptr. 912 (1977)
("child" as used in child abuse statute does not include unborn).
148. State would declare fetus neglected or abused and appoint a guardian who
would consent to medical care, which would include compulsory detoxification of
pregnant addicts in their third trimester. Perlmutter, supra note 96, at 55.
149. The consumption of alcohol during pregnancy can lead to smaller babies at
birth. Drinking For Two, supra note 96, at 37. If a woman discontinues the use of
alcohol, however, even in the beginning of the third trimester, the ill effects may be
prevented or minimized. Id. In the case of cocaine mothers, the state might want to
intervene not only to prohibit the mother from continuing her drug abuse, but in
order to take custody of the child after birth. See Barol, Cocaine Babies: Hooked At
Birth, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1986, at 57. (cocaine mothers likely to abuse or neglect
baby).
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ior is that state intervention probably would not be allowed until
the third trimester, when the fetus is viable. 150 By the third trimester, however, drug and alcohol abuse has already resulted in deform" ' Compulsory
ity and abnormality to the developing fetus.15
detoxification in the third trimester would clearly benefit the fetus, but it
would not prevent fetal injury." 2
Attempts at intervention prior to the third trimester, when-fetal
injury is most likely preventable, s would probably not be successful. Courts would be unwilling to undermine a woman's absolute
right to the control over her own body during the first trimester of
pregnancy.8 4 Furthermore, if women fear state intrusion into their
personal lives, they might not seek prenatal care or might not be
honest with their doctors regarding activities in which they are engaged. 55 In this way, state intervention might indirectly harm the
fetus, in the state's attempt to help the fetus.
A related problem with state intervention concerns the determination of what maternal behavior might be enjoined. Inadequate
maternal nutrition,'156 cigarette smoking,'

57

excessive exercise' 5 8 and

150. The compelling interest of the state in potential life does not arise until
viability, when protection of fetal life "has both logical and biological justifications."
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
151. In the first few weeks following conception, the mass of the fetus grows by
2.5 million times, as all of the body's systems are formed. Starr, supra note 91, at 58.
It is at this development and differential stage that interference leads to malformity
and defects. Id.
152. Compulsory detoxification would benefit the fetus because studies have
shown that "[i]f treatment is instituted for several weeks prior to delivery, it is likely
that the infant will show no abstience symptoms." Maternal Narcotic Addiction,
supra note 96, at 35.
153. See Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REv. 579, 589 (1965)
("medicine emphasized that the crucial period of intrauterine development during
which the fetus would be most susceptible to environmental influences was during the
first trimester, long before viability.").
154. But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (privacy right is not absolute and does not create an unlimited right "to do with one's body as one pleases").
155. Cf. Heroin Mothers, supra note 96, at 460 (addicts generally do not volunteer information concerning history of addiction and often lack prenatal care).
156. Good nutritional status of the mother is "the most important factor in contributing to the healthy development of the human conceptus." PRENATAL INFLUENCES,

supra note 1, at 57.

157. Cigarette smoking during pregnancy generally produces babies that weigh
a half pound less than the babies of nonsmokers. Seligman, supra note 96, at 77. This
lower birth weight may result in "immature lungs, bleeding within the brain, bowel
problems, infections and intellectual impairment." Id.
158. Increased maternal body temperature may harm fetal development in the
early stages. Starr, supra note 91, at 59. Intense exercise for a protracted time period
may generate enough heat to cause fetal damage. Id. See also PRENATAL INFLUENCES,
supra note 1, at 426 ("the mother's motor activities, walking, running ...and the like
...may well play a role in the individual differentiation of the fetus"). But see WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 2, at 256 ("not necessary for the pregnant woman to
limit exercise, provided she does not become excessively fatigued or risk injury to
herself or her fetus.") (emphasis added).
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exposure to diseasel" each detrimentally affect the developing fetus.
In exercising its parens patriae duties, can a state force a woman to
quit smoking, quit exercising, eat properly, or prevent her from going places where there is a high risk of exposure to disease? Al-

though these questions may seem ridiculous, courts would be faced
with responding to them in defining what constitutes fetal welfare
and well-being.' 60
Thus, state intervention in prenatal care would prevent some
fetal injury and death. Intervention should be limited, however, to

Ideally,
life-saving procedures and to third trimester fetuses.'
women should take the best care of their bodies during pregnancy,"6 2
but the state should not be allowed to force a woman to observe
overreaching standards of care. State intervention prior to the third
trimester, even combined with the fetal rights at stake, would ignore
the woman's right to privacy which the United States Supreme
Court guaranteed in Roe v. Wade. 65
V.

MATERNAL LIABILITY UNDER CRIMINAL STATUTES

In addition to potential civil liability for negligent prenatal care,
women who engage in activities which threaten injury to the fetus

could also face criminal liability.'" Criminal liability would be based
159. Maternal gonorrhea can produce blindness in newborns. Ways To Protect
Your Unborn Child, supra note 5, at 68. Maternal syphilis may "cause brain damage,
skin lesions, malformations of the teeth and even death in babies." Id. Children of
diabetics who do not control their diabetes adequately are born with a higher number
of congenital abnormalities. Id. Catching rubella during pregnancy often leads to
birth defects. Starr, supra note 91, at 58. See also Blattner, Desmond, Franklin &
HIll, The Relation of Maternal Disease to Fetal and Neonatal Morbidity and Mortality, 8 PED. CLINICS N. AM. 421 (1961) (lists maternal infectious diseases and likelihood of effect on fetus); Kalter & Warkany, Congential Malformations, 265 NEW.
ENG. J. MED. 1046 (1961) (maternal syphilis can lead to deafness and retardation).

See also

PRENATAL INFLUENCES,

supra note 1, at 269-321 (infectious diseases of

mother affect the fetus).
160. One argument in favor of prohibiting maternal use of alcohol, cigarettes
and drugs is that the prohibition would pass the United States Supreme Court's "rational basis" test. Robertson, supra note 118, at 442-43. It would not be necessary for
a state to show a compelling interest in prohibiting these substances "because there is
no fundamental right to use psychoactive substances." Id. at 442.
161. One author rationalizes more intrusive state action on the grounds that a
woman's obligations to her fetus would only arise when she chose not to exercise her
right to abort, regardless of when the decision to continue the pregnancy was made.
Robertson, supra note 118, at 442. This then, would permit intrusion prior to the
third trimester.
162. "Good prenatal care is vital for the ... delivery of a healthy baby from a
healthy mother." WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 245.
163. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
164. Civil liability is "[a] sum of money assessed either as general, special or
liquidated damages" in a civil action brought to redress private injury. BLACK'S,
supra note 46, at 223. In contrast, criminal liability charges a violation of criminal law
and involves penal damages. Id. at 336-37.
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on a novel interpretation of child abuse and neglect statutes. 6 5 In
order to create this liability, however, a child as defined in these
statutes would have to be extended to include fetuses. 6" Some
courts have already demonstrated67 a willingness to include the unborn in the definition of a child.

The state of California recently implemented this interpretation
in a case where a woman was accused of contributing to the death of
her newborn, which constituted a criminal misdemeanor."6 8 She was
charged with failing to "furnish necessary medical attendance" to
the fetus, under a statute normally used to collect child support.'
The charges provided that the woman failed to follow her doctor's
instructions. 110 These instructions were to abstain from illegal drugs,
to avoid sexual intercourse and to immediately call the hospital if
she began to hemorrhage. 1 7' Although the case was dismissed, it
shows a willingness to try to expand fetal rights into the area of
criminal law.
Child abuse and neglect statutes have already been successfully
enforced in order to grant custody of a fetus to the state. In Hoener
v. Bertinato,' when an unborn child's parents refused a blood
transfusion necessary to save the fetus' life, custody of the fetus was
granted to the state under a child abuse and neglect statute. 73 In
Hoener, the New Jersey Juvenile Court granted custody prior to
7 8
birth.1 7 4 Nevertheless, the transfusion did not occur until birth.

165. Although definitions of child abuse vary, most definitions involve sexual
abuse or "nonaccidental physical or mental injury." Myers, supra note 23, at 24-25.
Neglect involves unintentional, as well as intentional acts or omissions. Id. at 25-26.
See also Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 624, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1952) ("neglect..
. is the failure to exercise the care that the circumstances justly demand. It embraces
willful as well as unintentional disregard of duty.").
166. "The only limitation expressed in the [child abuse and neglect] statutes is
at the upper end of the age range ....
It must be admitted, however, that legislators
probably were not thinking of unborn children when they passed such statutes." Myers, supra note 23, at 26.
167. See, e.g., People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. 782, 298 P. 961 (1931) (father's
duty to provide child with necessities included unborn child).
168. See Is Ignoring M.D. Criminal?73 A.B.A.J. 23 (1987) [hereinafter A.B.A.J.].
169. Id. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970) (Supp. 1987).
170. The woman had a condition known as placenta previa, which can result in
fetal death if appropriate precautions are not taken. A.B.A.J., supra note 168, at 23.
171. The charges state that the woman used marijuana and amphetamines during the pregnancy. Id. She also waited 12 hours to call the hospital, after she began to
hemorrhage. Id. Furthermore, after she began to hemorrhage, she engaged in sexual
intercourse. Id.
172. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
173. Id. The parents refused the transfusion on religious grounds, because they
were Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. at 519, 171 A.2d at 142.
174. "[Sltatute is applicable ... even though the child is not yet born." Id. at
525, 171 A.2d at 145.
175. The transfusion was to be given immediately upon birth. Id. at 519, 171
A.2d at 141. The hearing was held prior to birth, in order to avoid an emergency
court hearing immediately after birth. Id. at 525, 171 A.2d at 144.
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The question, then, remains whether compulsory medical treatment
in utero can be enforced
through the implementation of child abuse
176
and neglect statutes.
Although the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that a
fetus is not neglected while in the womb, the use of criminal liability
for prenatal care is an impermissible extension of the parenspatriae
interest. Criminal sanctions would undermine the doctor-patient relationship, making it less likely that women would confide in their
doctors.1 7 This is because doctors would probably be the ones responsible for reporting fetal abuse or neglect.1 7 8 If women did not
confide in their doctors, fearing criminal liability, the doctor, in
turn, would not be able to provide the best prenatal care."7 ' As in
the state intervention situation, the attempt to help the fetus would
result in more harm than good.
VI. CONCLUSION
All children should have the right to begin life free from preventable defects and deformities. With the increased general knowledge concerning the causes of certain defects, as well as the greater
availability of in utero surgery, women now, more than ever, can
take steps to insure that their fetus will be healthy. Women today
have access to a wide variety of information concerning substances
that are or may be harmful to the developing fetus. Consequently,
all mothers should avoid these substances. A developing fetus
should enjoy the best prenatal care possible.
The answer to inadequate prenatal care, however, cannot be
found through state intervention or the imposition of liability,
whether civil or criminal. The imposition of civil liability will not
further a child's right to be born with a sound mind and body. Civil
liability compensates the child who is injured when he is a fetus, but
cannot adequately prevent the injury. Likewise, the enforcement of
prenatal care through criminal liability provides an inadequate solution. The use of criminal sanctions would discourage mothers from
being honest with their doctors and would make the doctor an ad176.

For a discussion of compulsory in utero medical treament, see Lenow,

supra note 3.

177. See A.B.A.J., supra note 168, at 23 ("'you would be a damn fool to walk
into a physician's office and tell him that you have done drugs or have not followed
his medical advice.'" (quoting defense attorney Richard Boesen)).
178. See Doudera, supra note 14, at 44. Doudera asks: "[Sihould physicians and
other health care providers who recognize or should have recognized that a fetus is
being, or that a newborn has been, injured as a result of the mother's conduct have an
obligation to report the abuse?"
179. If a woman conceals critical information from her doctor, she may receive
inadequate prenatal care. "Bad prenatal care may be worse than none." WILLIAMS
OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 245 (emphasis in original).
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versary, thus undermining the doctor-patient relationship. Similarly,
permitting state intervention prior to fetal viability, when intervention would be most beneficial, would impermissibly encroach on a
mother's constitutional rights. The solution to inadequate prenatal
care must be found in the mother herself, through education and
through access to medical services.
Shannon S. Sullivan

